INTRODUCTION
THIS PAPER EXPLORES a one-agent Bayesian model of learning-by-doing and technological choice. In the model, experience yields information, which improves decisions and raises productivity. Once the productivity gains on a given technology are exhausted, further growth can occur only by switching to a better technology. How transferable is the previously acquired knowledge in the new activity? This will depend on how similar the new activity is to the old, and this depends on how correlated their unknown parameters are. In this sense, transferable information is general human capital, and nontransferable information is specific human capital.
In its focus on the choice between sticking to a"current" technology and switching to a better one, our model is closest in spirit to that of Parente (1994) . Our paper adds to the literature by analyzing the full dynamics. Parente, as well as Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), had looked only at constant growth paths, and did not ask whether these were reachable from arbitrary initial conditions. Globally stable long-run growth can arise in our model too: For some values of the parameters, the agent switches to a new technological grade infinitely often. But for other parameter values, an agent will stick to an old technology forever, and experience long-run stagnation. Moreover, the long-run value of the growth rate may depend on initial conditions. In particular, "overtaking" may occur-an ' We thank the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University for technical and financial help, and Chung Tse for help with the research. We are grateful for comments from the editor and two anonymous referees. 1299 agent may be so skilled at a technology that he will refuse to switch to a better, but unfamiliar one. Such an agent may in the long run be overtaken by an agent who initially is less skilled and less attached to the technology at hand, and who therefore is more willing to try a new one.
TECHNOLOGICAL DEEPENING AND OPENING
We now model first technological deepening, by which we mean learning more about a given grade of a technology, and technological opening, by which we mean learning about a new technology.
Learning a Technology
A risk-neutral agent can produce a good with one of several grades of a technology indexed by n E [0, oo). If he uses grade n at date t, a decision z yields net output via the production function2 about On, which allows him to make a better decision z. This reduces the posterior variance, vart(0n), and raises his expected net output. The learning process is bounded-using grade n of a technology forever allows the agent to learn On completely so that Et(q) -y?n[l -ow2], which is finite for fixed n.
2Prescott (1972) and Wilson (1975) analyze this type of production function. 3The information that the agent gets depends on n, but not on z. Hence (2a) and (2b) remain valid even in a multiperiod maximization problem.
The Transfer of Human Capital across Grades of Technology
There is no direct cost of switching to a different grade of technology, and no cost to adjusting z. The link between grades is informational: We suppose that the relation between on and on + k for any n and k 2 0 is We assume that the prior over 01 at date 1 is normal. Equation (3), and the normality of wnt imply that the posterior belief at each date over the parameter of any grade, On, will also be normal. We define the following functions of x and portray them in Figure 1 ), x** exists and is unique. Suppose that at each date the agent chooses a jump size of k. Then the posterior variance over the most recent grade chosen at date t, xt, will be given by the tth iterate of the h(,k) mapping from x=x1. The sequence {xt}t1 converges monotonically to x**.
Throughout we shall assume that the agent is myopic: The agent maximizes current period return in each period. Define G(x, k) to be the expected net output from initial posterior variance x when a jump of size k is chosen and the status quo grade is grade 0. Then
Define x* to be the value of x such that G(x, 0) = G(x, 1). Since G(-, 0) and G(-, 1) are linear in x with slopes 1 and ay respectively, x* is well-defined whenever ay 0 1 (which, for ease of exposition, we assume throughout). Throughout, we impose a "No Recall" constraint: Once a grade has been passed over for a higher grade, it is never recalled. Moreover, we constrain k < 1: any jump size k in [0, 1] is feasible.
CASE A (OVERTAKING; BELIEFS AFFECT LONG-RUN GROWTH CATASTROPHICALLY)
We define Case A by the following requirements: variance converges to x1*. This is a bifurcation or a catastrophe situation: radically different long-run behavior occurs depending on whether initial variance is less than or greater than x*. In particular we have the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3.1 (Overtaking): Assume Case A. Suppose two agents, I and II, are using the same grade n and have initial posterior variance, x4 and x4 respectively, with x' < x* < x'. Then there will be overtaking in the following sense: Agent I (who has lowerx) initially has a higher expected output. From some date onwards, II will surpass I in expected output. In particular, the high human capital agent, Agent I, will STICK forever, and the low human capital agent, Agent II, will SWITCH forever.
Could Case A Arise in the Presence of Competition?
The answer is "Yes," although an agent who always chose to STICK would eventually be driven out of business by those who chose to always SWITCH. Assume a continuum of farmers that grow corn, each facing the structure in Section 2. Now add a fixed resource for which farmers must compete: To plow his land, a farmer needs a bullock. Bullocks live for one period, and they are supplied by another sector where there is no technical progress: The technology for raising them is fixed through time, and their price in terms of corn is P(Q), where Q is the aggregate supply of corn. With usual assumptions on prefer-ences, PO would be monotonically increasing in Q without bound.5 At t = 0, suppose the status quo for all farmers is n = 0. Farmers are of 2 types, 1 and 2, having measure 1ul and A2. Suppose that the initial beliefs of type l's are x = 0, while those of type 2's are x = 4*. Then type l's always STICK, hence their x equals 0 always. Type 2's always SWITCH, hence their x equals x1* always. If no one were to exit, aggregate output at t would be Qt = ,ll(l -ow2) + 112Yt(1 -x4j *-o2). But for a type 1, expected profit, 1 -o2 -P(Qt), turns negative after some date, and he will optimally plan to exit then. In short, the strategy "always STICK" may be optimal even when others are switching, although it drives the stagnating type 1 out of the market and gives him a long-run payoff of zero. w2, 1 will again STICK to n = 0. But 2 will again SWITCH, this time to n = 2. Because a = 0, 2's signals will from this point on be uncorrelated with 01, and so l's payoff to switching to n = 1 remains unchanged. Hence 1 will STICK to n = 0 forever. By continuity, this logic remains intact for the case in which a is positive but small: For informational spillovers to induce the laggard to SWITCH, they must do so early 5This would occur if, for instance, bullocks could instead be slaughtered for meat, and there was diminishing marginal utility of consuming corn and meat. 6At t = 0, a type 1 is better off than a type 2, and there are real-world examples of that. Think of a type 1 as today's Intel corporation. Despite making a slower computer chip (than the rival RISC chip), Intel still holds more than 90% of the chip market for desktop PC's, because popular software is largely available only for Intel-compatible machines (Markoff (1994) ). If it doesn't switch to faster chips, however, Intel will eventually lose its market. on, before the leader pulls so far away that his signals cease to have any significant effect on the laggard's payoffs.7 
CASE B (POSITIVE LONG-RUN GROWTH FROM

A COMPARISON OF CASES A AND B
The Role of Experience in the Two Cases
The accumulation of experience with a technology-i.e., a lowering of x-in Case B promotes upgrading, whereas in Case A it creates a resistance to it, and can cause a subset of agents to experience stagnation in the long run. This difference is highlighted in Figure 3, (Berry and Fristedt (1985) ) in which there is just one decision: which arm to pull-which is like choosing n in our model. The essential differences are three: (1) in our model, there is a second decision: how to operate the chosen grade, and (2) learning is not about the grade's quality (which is known), but about how to operate the grade; (3) the Bandit model says that, under discounting, the agent may end up on an inferior arm, but (in contrast to our Case A) it does not imply any tendency for an uninformed agent to overtake an informed one.
9 Radner and Stiglitz (1984) show that there may be a nonconcavity in the value function in a neighborhood of zero information. Our results do not rely on such nonconcavities. G(x, 1) -G(x, 0) is positive. Since G(x, 1) -G(x, 0) = (y -1) , the lemma follows.
Q.E.D. G(x*,0) = G(x*, 1) so Lemma 7.4 implies that k*(x*) > 0 so x* <x. Equation (7) implies that when a < 1, dG(k,k)/dklk=o < 0 so x >x. For any x such that k*(x) > O, k*(x) is the solution to dG(x, k)/dk = 0 unless the boundary k = 1 is reached. From Lemma 7.1 it is easy to check that this solution is strictly decreasing in x on (0, X) whenever ay > 1 (where we use the fact that when a < 1, x > X, and the fact that when a > 1, x < 0). Hence there will exist an x 2 0 such that for x in [0, x) the boundary k = 1 is the optimal solution and for x in (x, X), k* (x) is strictly decreasing in x. This completes the proof of part (ii). Q.E.D.
